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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis examines the changing significance of education for fertility inequality in Cameroon. 
It uses data from demographic and health surveys from 1991 to 2011 and a mix of linear regression 
and decomposition analysis to identify the factors contributing most strongly to the changes in 
inequalities in Cameroon, with a specific focus on the contribution of composition and behavioral 
effects. The findings show a rise in fertility inequality during the study period, with an increasing 
concentration of births among women of lower levels of schooling.   
The results from the decomposition analysis suggest that the main driver of this growing inequality 
is behavioral differentiation. Importantly, the study highlights both the quantitative and the 
qualitative effects of education (the magnitude and the pathways through which it contributes to 
inequality). Quantitatively, the contribution of education to reproductive inequalities increases 
overtime. Qualitatively, the contribution shifts from mainly behavioral effect to predominantly 
compositional mechanisms. The study concludes by a discussion of the implications of this rising 
fertility inequality on prospects of demographic dividend in Cameroon.   
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
General Overview 
In 2014, the world's population reached 7.2 billion people and was increasing by nearly 82 million 
more every year. Much of this growth stems from fertility trends, which, according to UNICEF 
estimates, contributed for over 300 000 new babies born every day (UN, 2014; UNICEF, 2016). 
This remarkable expansion does not occur evenly across all countries and continents. In fact, the 
bulk of the growth comes mostly from the developing world, and in particular from Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA),1currently the fastest-thriving region (see Figure 1.1). Because of the pace of its 
population growth, SSA’s share of the world’s overall population is expected to increase from 
13% today to 20% in 2050 (Tabutin et al. 2004; CEPII, 2014).  
 
Figure 1.1: Contribution of major areas to the world population 2015, 2030, 2050 and 2100  
 
                                                          
1 The term “Sub-Saharan Africa” used here refers to the area of the African continent which lies south of the Sahara 
Desert. Geographically, the demarcation line is the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. There are 42 countries located 
on the sub-Saharan African mainland, in addition to six island nations (Madagascar, Seychelles, Comoros, Cape 
Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe).  
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Other regions, by that time, are expected to experience a population decline and aging due to 
below-replacement fertility rates (Stark & Kohler, 2002). The challenges of this demographic 
divide are thus numerous and relevant for a variety of reasons. In a globalized and interconnected 
world, the consequences of Africa’s population trends will extend beyond the region, as it’s 
already the case with signaled the flows of migrants from the poorest nations to the more developed 
countries in search of a better life and material security.2 Within the region itself, these trends will 
present both opportunities and challenges. According to current projections, the number of young 
sub-Saharan Africans reaching working age (15-64) by 2035 will far exceed that of the rest of the 
world combined. Already, the region is confronted with a population structure made up of a large 
proportion (over 50 percent) of young adults in the working-age population which means a high 
rate of workforce growth and an equally large proportion of children and under 15 years old 
                                                          
2 See Somini’s Sengupta: “Heat, Hunger and War Force Africans onto a ‘Road of Fire’”  
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/15/world/africa/agadez-climate-change.html?_r=0 
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population (over 40 percent) as well as a growing school age population (Cincotta, 2010). If well 
harnessed, this youth bulge could spur a significant socioeconomic development and turn the 
region into a major actor in the world economy (Malmberg, 2008). But, for now, Sub-Saharan 
Africa remains the poorest region in the world. Despite substantial economic growth since the turn 
of the millennium,3 its average Human Development Index4 value (0.475) is the lowest of any 
region but it’s nonetheless rising at a very rapid pace. 5(World Bank, 2015; UNDP, 2013)  
The driving factor of SSA’s exceptional population expansion is high fertility, indeed the highest 
in the world. Despite some decline in most African countries since the 1990s, fertility rates have 
remained high in the last two decades mainly because of improvements in maternal and child 
health (Bongaarts and Casterline, 2013; Tabutin et al. 2004). Recent studies show signs of stalls 
and reversals of fertility rates in several countries (Bongaarts 2006; Bongaarts 2008; Shapiro and 
Gebreselassie 2008). According to data from the USAID-funded Demographic and Health 
Surveys, the total fertility rate in SSA in 2013 averaged 5.4 children (Westoff et al., 2013. Such 
high fertility rates could represent an obstacle to socioeconomic development both at the national 
and local level.  
Conversely, reductions in fertility may translate into a substantial demographic bonus because 
delayed childbearing results in a larger portion of the population being found in the productive 
ages. This is known as the demographic dividend.  
 
                                                          
3 6.4 percent on average during 2002-2008 according to the World Bank. 
4 HDI. 
5 “Since 2000, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced the fastest annual growth rates in the Human Development Index 
(HDI) among all regions - growing at an annual rate of 1.7 percent between 2000 and 2010 and 0.9 percent between 
2010 and 2014. Twelve countries in the region, including Botswana, Cap Verde, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, and Zambia have levels that put them in the high or 
medium human development group, individually. However Sub-Saharan Africa, on average, remains in the low human 
development category and HDI levels are still low: a shortage of good work opportunities is preventing many from 
reaching their full potential and making decent livelihoods.” (UNDP, 2013) 
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Dividends from fertility decline  
According to the theory of the demographic dividend, a fertility decline can modify population 
structure and positively affect socio-economic development both at the individual and national 
level. At the individual level, a decrease in the number of children per family tends to raise the 
average amount of resources available per child (Blake 1981). At the national level, the shift from 
high to low fertility alters the age structure of the population thereby improving the support ratio 
(the proportion of people of working age, compared to dependents, especially children). With more 
adults than children, countries can now concentrate more resources towards the education, health 
and overall wellbeing of children and invest to raise their human capital resources in ways that 
create the conditions for further demographic dividends and economic development (Bloom, 
Canning & Sevilla 2003). 
By changing the age structure of a society, a fertility decline could spur socioeconomic 
development. When countries succeed in adequately taking advantage of their population 
potential, societies experience a virtuous cycle of lower dependency ratio, an increase of their labor 
force and an important economic boom which, in turn, improves socioeconomic indicators 
(Crenshaw et al. 1997). Hence, a more favorable age structure generates a human capital dividend, 
specifically by improving the schooling and health of the population (Anh et al. 1998; Bhat 2002; 
Knodel et al. 1990). Higher levels of human capital, especially better educated girls, also translate 
into lower fertility rates by delaying marriage, reducing desired fertility, and increasing the use of 
modern methods of contraception (Diamond et al. 1999; Jejeebhoy 1995; Muhuri et al. 1994). 
Furthermore, improvements in the quality of education and schooling affect long-term prospects 
for socioeconomic development as the benefits resulting from a high human capital spread over 
into adulthood and to the next generation (Bloom, Canning & Sevilla 2003; Mason & Lee 2004). 
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The expansion of schooling creates a highly skilled and more entrepreneurial workforces and it 
reduces gender inequalities. It also reduces infant and child mortality while improving child 
nutrition (UNESCO 2010).  
Most sub-Saharan African countries have yet to accrue a demographic dividend. With young 
people making up the greatest proportion of its population, SSA will be the only region of the 
world where the number of young people will continue to grow substantially, and as indicated 
earlier in this chapter, more than half of the global population growth between now and 2050 is 
expected to occur in the continent (Ashford 2007; UNFPA and PRB 2012; UN 2015). The question 
therefore is how governments in the region can create the social, economic and institutional 
environment necessary to trigger a continuous fertility decline that spreads to all groups and 
induces a shared demographic bonus.  
The purpose of this thesis is to add to the literature on fertility transitions by looking specifically 
at the historical trends and drivers of reproductive inequalities in Cameroon and their significance 
for future socioeconomic trends. Using data from 4 waves of Demographic and health surveys 
conducted in Cameroon between 1991 and 2011, and a mixed method of regression analyses and 
decomposition methods, the analyses investigate:  
1) The changes in reproductive inequalities in Cameroon; 
2) The main sources of these changes in reproductive inequalities; with specific attention to 
the significance of education in these processes.   
 
Study Setting 
The setting for this study is Cameroon, a central African country located in the Gulf of Guinea and 
extending over an area of 475,650 sq.km. Rich of an extreme diversity of landscapes and the 
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variety of its climate, the country is often referred to as Africa in miniature and constitutes a true 
human and cultural mosaic with more than 230 different ethnic groups divided into six major 
categories.6  
Figure 1.2: Map of the administrative Divisions of Cameroon 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The Sudanese, Hamites and Semites living in the regions of Adamawa, North, and Far North; usually Muslim. The 
Bantu, Semi-Bantu and related, and the Pygmies who occupy the rest of the country and are generally animists or 
Christians (DHS 2011). 
 
13 
 
The country’s demographics and economic profile resemble that of other SSA countries. Its 
population, estimated currently at more than 23 million people is characterized by its extreme 
youth. According to recent United Nations estimates, the proportion of the population under 15 
represents 40.5%7 of the total population and the dependency ratio is 78.1% (UN 2012).8 The 
country figures in the list of SSA countries where fertility transition started but has now stalled 
(5.1 children on average per women in 2011)9. After a period of decline (1991 - 1998), fertility 
rates reversed after 1998 as shown in Figure 1.4 
 
Figure 1.3: Trends in total fertility rates in Cameroon 1991 – 2011 
 
 
Cameroon's economy is based primarily on the revenues of the primary sector and its agriculture 
is a source of national pride for its diversity and unique richness in Central Africa. Added to this 
                                                          
7 This proportion is 55.3% for the population under 20. (CDHS-2012). 
8 This number means that each individual of working age in Cameroon must provide for himself and cover one child 
or one aged person additionally. 
9 There are nine other SSA countries which have experienced a stall in their fertility transitions and that includes: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote-d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (Harper, 2015) 
5.8
4.8
5
5.1
4
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
6
1991 1998 2004 2011
14 
 
are the oil and forestry revenues that had allowed the country to record a steady growth of its GDP 
at around 5% in the first two decades following its independence and to achieve a significant 
socioeconomic progress and a marked improvement in the living conditions of the population 
(Roubaud et al. 2000).  
But after 1986, economic mismanagement coupled with the drop of import commodities price, 
which Cameroon is still heavily dependent upon, precipitated the country into a period of deep 
recession and social downturn. In the late 1980s, the country finally resorted to external borrowing 
and accepted to put in place a structural adjustment program under the supervision of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite the return of economic growth since the year 2000 
and numerous development projects initiated by the government, Cameroon remains in the list of 
the world poorest countries (INS and MINFI 2010). According to the most recent Household 
survey data, the country has a poverty rate of 40% coupled with a 70% rate of underemployment 
among the occupied working-age population (ECAM 2011). Unemployment affects particularly 
the younger generations, as the economy does not create enough employment opportunities. 
The health of the economy has an important impact on population dynamics. In fact, several studies 
have examined the relationship between poverty and demographic behaviors in SSA in general 
(Boserup 1985; Lesthaeghe 1989; Lamlenn 1992; Schoumaker and Tabutin 1999; Vimard 2003) 
and in Cameroon in particular over the last 20 years (Eloundou Enyegue and Stokes 2000; 
Nouetagni 2004). Poverty is associated with high fertility (Schoumaker and Tabutin 1999). Poor 
households tend to rely on children for their old-age support (Caldwell 1982; Lesthaeghe 1989). 
According to this theory, that is the main reason why fertility has remained high in SSA and more 
so among the lowest SES groups (the least educated, poor rural women). 
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A study by Eloundou and Stokes (2000) showed a pattern of fertility decline following the 
country’s economic downturn in the mid-1980s.  Its findings indicated the existence of a divergent 
fertility trends between rural and urban areas (with the bulk of the decline confined to urban areas). 
Within urban areas, Nouetagni (2004) highlighted the existence of reproductive inequalities 
between women of poor households and those of rich households due to unequal access to 
contraceptive methods.  
The next chapter reviews previous studies on reproductive inequalities and discusses the 
theoretical and empirical contributions of the present thesis. Chapter 3 presents the data and 
methods used in this work. The findings of the analysis followed by a general conclusion of their 
implications for understanding future directions and consequences of fertility transitions in 
Cameroon are examined in chapter 4 and 5.  
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CHAPTER 2. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Previous Studies 
Inequality has economic, social, as well as political dimensions. It can be studied at the micro, 
meso, and macro levels. It generally presupposes an imbalance in the distribution of resources, 
services and positions between individual and societies (Grusky, 2001; Kerbo, 2000). Whether 
socioeconomic, cultural, or political, some degree of inequality exists in all societies, past or 
present, because of the uneven character of the distribution and access to limited goods and 
services, honors and prestige that are concentrated rather than diffused. Hence, the literature on 
the nature and magnitude of different types of inequalities (mostly economic) is abundant and 
transdisciplinary, with its first modern instances dating back to the 18th and early 19th century 
(Piketty, 2013). Many reasons explain this burgeoning interest at that time.  In fact, with the advent 
of the industrial revolution, the issue of the distribution of wealth becomes central, and social 
scientists, philosophers and novelists have begun to undertake a profound examination of the “deep 
structure of [income] inequality, the way it is justified, and its impact on individual lives” (Piketty, 
2013).    
Today, more than a century later, this debate continues and the study of inequalities has opened a 
vast field of inquiry and spread across several scientific disciplines, with a constant renewal in its 
theoretical approaches as well as its methodological tools. One of the earliest and most used 
method of capturing inequality is the Lorenz curve, also known as Lorenz’ concentration curve.   
In 1905, M. O. Lorenz, an economist, published his “methods of measuring the concentration of 
wealth” in order to describe “at what point a community is to be placed between the two extremes, 
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-equality, on the one hand, and the ownership of all wealth by one individual on the other.” 
(Lorenz, 1905)  
At issue then is the dire importance of knowing whether or not the distribution of income is 
becoming more or less unequal and contrarily to other authors at that time, Lorenz puts an 
emphasis on the “need to take account simultaneously of changes in wealth [distribution] and 
changes in population [composition]” (Lorenz, 1905). He proposes a graphical representation of 
the percentage share of the accumulated wealth detained by a particular segment of the total 
population.  
The success of Lorenz’ method quickly transcended the narrow field of the social sciences 
(economics, sociology, etc.) to find applications in other scientific disciplines such as biology and 
business for instance. 
However, it is not until the late 1980s that demographers started using Lorenz’ concentration 
method to capture population inequalities and to measure the differences, disparities and 
heterogeneities in the risk of occurrence of demographic phenomena (such as fertility, mortality, 
morbidity) within a particular population or subgroups. Traditionally, demographers resort to 
summary measures (such as rates and ratios) and use differentials to account for population 
heterogeneities. These instruments, when broken down into individual components, give an idea 
of the effect of proximate determinants on the risk of occurrence of the phenomena.  
But an exclusive reliance on differentials, though very useful, can be misleading in terms of policy-
decision making (Giroux et al, 2008). Indeed, cross-sectional measures can oversimplify and mask 
important differentiations (and differentiating processes and mechanisms from a longitudinal 
perspective or in the long run) among different population subgroups since it’s very seldom the 
case that there exists homogeneous population with respect to fertility, mortality, marriage, etc. 
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(Pullum, Casterline, and Shah, 1987). As Lutz (1987) highlighted, “there are always some 
subgroups of the population that have a higher risk of death, marriage, or divorce at certain ages. 
There is also no population where all women bear the same number of children” at the same time 
and/or over time. In order, therefore, to avoid this oversimplification, demographers developed 
fuller measures of population inequality to account and adjust for variations in the demographic 
risks.  
Concentration analyses are one example of such fuller measures. Because they are not consisting 
only of mere differentials in rates but also account for the variation in the size of the population, 
concentration measures “can shed light on many topics of demographic interest [and] may be 
relevant to policy decisions, especially those relating to the targeting of an intervention. If one-
fifth of women are bearing half the children, perhaps policies to reduce (or to increase) births 
should be directed toward this group” (Vaupel & Goodwin, 1987). 
Until recently, the first studies using concentration to study fertility inequalities focused mainly on 
the developed countries. In 1987, Vaupel and Goodwin found that for the cohort of U.S women 
born in 1930, 36 percent who had four or more children accounted for fully 63 percent of all 
children born in this cohort. Ten percent of the women were childless, and the 32 percent of the 
women with one or two children accounted for only 17 percent of all births. For this author, this 
constitutes a “division of labor” in the sense that a portion of the cohort produces most of the 
offspring and the remaining portion of the cohort staying childless or with few descendants. 
Similarly, a more recent study by Martin (2000) analyzing fertility pattern of cohorts of women 
from the mid-70s to the mid-90s, highlights the changes in reproductive behaviors across different 
cohorts of women. His findings show that up to the mid-1970s, most women were entering unions 
before the age of 30, regardless of their educational attainment, except a substantial part of college 
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educated women who were postponing childbearing past age 30 and a large majority of these 
college educated women were remaining childless past that age. The reason, according to Martin, 
lies in the labor force participation, which conflicts with traditional family roles and acts to increase 
childlessness and childbearing at later ages among them.  
Fertility trends observed from 1975 to 1995 indicate an overall decline of first births for women at 
all education levels revealing “that role competition has increased for women at all educational 
levels, not only for the most highly educated.” Interestingly, however, for women of four years’ 
college graduate and age 30, the study shows an increase in first birth rates while at the same time 
a significant portion of non-college graduates were experiencing an increasing childlessness. This 
shows a growing reproductive inequality between college graduates women and their counterparts 
and an increased ability of the first group to time their births. Also, economic inequalities may fuel 
heterogeneity in reproductive behavior, which, in its turn, may affect the opportunities and 
outcomes of the next generation. In this case, a concentration of fertility has a direct impact on the 
future prospects of the offspring and can both cause and be a resulting consequence of social 
inequalities.   
The association between current fertility inequalities and future economic inequality in the US is 
examined in Lichter and Wooton (2005). Seeking to understand ‘why families in the developed 
countries are shrinking and what it means’, they found that the increasing concentration of birth in 
the US over the past 100 years hasn’t resulted in more concentration of births among women of 
historically disadvantaged groups but rather a growing share of the newborns was due to women 
presenting social and demographic characteristics “that place them at less risk of long-term social 
and economic disadvantages.” They find no evidence that America’s future generation is at risk of 
poor socioeconomic outcomes based on current trends in the concentration of reproduction.  
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Quid of developing countries, and especially Sub-Saharan Africa? And, furthermore, what are the 
consequences of a concentration of reproduction on the individuals and societies in the context of 
countries that have yet to complete their demographic transition? 
Lutz (1987) observed an increase in the concentration when fertility starts to decrease, presumably 
because fertility decline is driven by women of higher SES having more control over their fertility. 
Lutz highlights that inequalities in desired family sizes tend to be higher in less developed 
countries than in more developed modern societies and contribute significantly to a greater 
heterogeneity in the distribution of births with its host of potential social, economic and 
demographic implications. Using a different approach and a fuller measure of reproductive 
inequalities (the CV squared), Giroux et al. (2008) confirm the hypothesis of a “transition-
dependency” in the concentration of fertility over time in sub-Saharan Africa. They find that, as 
the total fertility rate (TFR) declines, the concentration of births increases significantly. Moreover, 
their study shows that the increasing heterogeneity in fertility is caused both by behavioral 
differences between groups but also change in their composition. 
Eloundou-Enyegue et al. (2017) proposes a “demographic Kuznets” (dK) hypothesis to understand 
the recent trends in fertility inequality in sub-Saharan Africa and some of their broader 
implications. The dK theory stresses that reproductive inequalities evolve in a bell-shaped curve 
and go through three subsequent phases as countries experience a fertility transition scenario 
overtime. In the first period, inequalities increase rapidly due to economic factors (socioeconomic 
differentiation initiated by women of higher SES who play a leading role in the decline in national 
fertility). During the second phase, the level of inequalities continues to increase but at a much 
slower rate than previously observed due this time to changes in the population composition (for 
instance a massive education program which results in a larger share of women with high level of 
21 
 
schooling in the overall population). The third and final phase is one characterized by declining 
reproductive inequalities as a result of cultural diffusion. Under this scenario, fertility rates decline 
for all socioeconomic groups and not just for the highly educated women thus resulting in a shared 
dividend. This final stage doesn’t necessarily mean a complete absence of uneven distribution of 
births within the population but rather that the disparities in fertility rates across different 
socioeconomic groups are less abyssal.  
Armed with this theoretical tool and using several measures of fertility inequalities, the study finds 
that sub-Saharan African countries are currently experiencing growing reproductive 
heterogeneities because they are at the beginning of their fertility transitions. Moreover, in all the 
countries in the study, the main factor of the change in fertility inequalities is a behavioral 
differentiation.  
 
Theoretical Framework   
Building on these empirical results, the central premise of this thesis is that reproductive 
inequalities in Cameroon have increased over time. I argue that the changes in the levels and trends 
in reproductive inequalities are driven by behavioral changes as well as ongoing changes in the 
population composition (Figure 2.1). 
Behavioral effects comprise factors related to reproductive and other socioeconomic attitudes and 
conducts. Compositional effects comprise elements that alter population structures such as an 
increase in the proportion of educated women or a rise in urbanization that might affect the 
distribution of births.   
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework  
  
  
  
REPRODUCTIVE 
INEQUALITIES 
Compositional Effects 
- Mass education 
- Income redistribution 
 
 
Behavioral Effects 
- Change in fertility differentials 
- Access to family planning 
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CHAPTER 3. 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Study Contributions 
Building on our previous work on the historical drivers of fertility change in Cameroon this study 
seeks to contribute to the literature on reproductive inequality in sub-Saharan Africa (Kirk and 
Pillet, 1998; Shapiro and Tambashe, 2002; Bongaarts, 2003; Giroux et al. 2008, Eloundou-
Enyegue et al. 2017). Its contributions are both theoretical and methodological. Past studies have 
looked at the levels and trends of reproductive inequality in the developing countries but they 
focused primarily on fertility differentials as their principal tool for measuring such inequality 
(considering only the changes in the average difference in fertility levels between different 
socioeconomic groups and the determinants of these changes at the individual level). By doing so, 
they enriched the body of knowledge now available on the determinants of fertility transitions in 
SSA. However, their exclusive reliance on differentials as an indicator of overall reproductive 
inequalities limits policy making as well as analyses of historical changes of fertility inequalities 
(Bongaarts 2003; Lichter and Wooton 2005; Giroux et al. 2008, Eloundou-Enyegue et al. 2017). 
The main reason being that by looking only between-groups differences in rates, differentials can 
be misleading and not account for instance for the changes within groups such as a variation in the 
relative sizes of different groups along with their changing average performances.  
 
Using a more complete measure of reproductive inequality (the squared coefficient of variation, 
or CV²), helps to overcome such limitations and examine the primary driving factors of fertility 
inequalities in Cameroon. Such factors include, among others, socioeconomic inequalities with 
regard to human capital, access and uses of family planning, norms and values in family size and 
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fertility preferences, mass education, etc. that contribute significantly to the magnitude of fertility 
inequalities.  
 
Substantively, this thesis makes a number of key contributions. Using both differentials (micro 
level) and concentration measures (macro level), it, first, illustrates the trends in fertility 
inequalities in the last twenty years in Cameroon. Studies have done similar work but comparing 
across different SSA countries (Giroux et al. 2008). The idea here is the same: to highlight the 
influence of educational composition on the level of reproductive heterogeneities but within the 
context of one particular country. In other words, the goal is to look at how reproductive 
inequalities evolve in Cameroon and how the effect of education on reproductive inequalities 
changes. Furthermore, this research also examines the changes in wanted fertility inequality. This 
addition will improve the conclusion results by drawing attention to both wanted fertility and 
overall fertility inequalities.  
 
The second substantive contribution of this study is to identify the main sources of change in recent 
trends in fertility inequalities in Cameroon. Using decomposition methods, it identifies factors 
contributing most strongly to the changes in reproductive inequalities over time looking both at 
the compositional and the behavioral effects. It then highlights the individual contribution of 
different educational groups to the sources of change in CV. Based on the above considerations, 
this study hypothesizes the following:  
 
H1. Fertility is increasingly concentrated in Cameroon over the last two decades (1991 - 2011); 
H2. Ongoing behavioral differentials and changes in the educational composition of the population 
account for the growth in fertility inequality in Cameroon between 1991 and 2011; 
25 
 
H3. The overall contribution of education to reproductive inequalities has changed quantitatively 
and qualitatively. Quantitatively, it has increased over time. Qualitatively, the contribution shifts 
from behavioral to compositional mechanisms.  
  
Data and Measures  
The study uses data from four waves of demographic and health surveys fielded in Cameroon in 
1991, 1998, 2004 and 2011. These DHS data are useful to study demographic change and allow 
in-depth analysis of fertility levels and changes over time. I primarily use data from the individual 
women module of the survey directed specifically to a nationally representative sample of women 
of childbearing age (15 - 49) and which captures information on reproduction, knowledge and use 
of contraception, pregnancy and prenatal care, plus a number of other variables related to 
immunization and child health, marriage, maternal mortality, etc.  Altogether, the analyses focus 
on 3871 women aged 15 - 49 in 1991, 5019 in 1998, 10656 in 2004 and 13359 in 2011, and cover 
a period of 20 years.  
 Figure 3.1 illustrates the trends in age-specific fertility rates in Cameroon between 1991 and 2011. 
We observe that there was a decline in fertility in all ages, and more particularly among younger 
women (15-34) from 1991 to 2004. In 2011, fertility rates at these age groups start to increase and 
return at almost the same level as in 1998. On the graph, one can see a reversal in the fertility 
trends in Cameroon, especially among the younger age groups (25-34), contributing to the increase 
in the nation total fertility rate in 2011 (5.1 children on average per women). (CDHS, 2012) 
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Figure 3.1: Trends in age-specific fertility rates in Cameroon 1991 - 2011 
 
 
The next figure (3.2) shows the trends in the mean number of children ever born (CEB) and the 
results reveal a slightly different story. As the graph shows, women at the end of their childbearing 
age still have a large offspring but recent trends indicate a downward direction. For instance, 
women aged 45-49 in 2011 had on average fewer births than previous generations of the same age 
groups. 
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Figure 3.2: Trends in the mean number of children ever born in Cameroon 1991 - 2011 
 
 
The CEB is a cohort-based measure of fertility and as such a good indicator of difference in 
reproductive behaviors between different cohort groups. However, its utility is limited to 
comparing past generations fertility behaviors and it tells us nothing about the behavior of women 
who have yet to complete their reproductive lives. In other words, since the CEB is a summary of 
the completed fertility of women at the end of their childbearing years, it can be problematic to 
use it for a comparative purpose of fertility inequality between different groups. For this reason, 
most analyses on fertility inequality use the TFR instead which is a hypothetical measure of 
completed (cohort) fertility that can be computed for different socioeconomic groups. This study 
uses both the CEB (for the regression analyses at individual level) and the TFR (to account for 
inequalities at the national level) as dependent variables.  
In addition to monitoring the patterns of age-specific fertility rates to identify reproductive 
inequalities over time, there is also another simple way to do so graphically. A popular measure 
used in the study of income inequalities for instance is the Lorenz curve (or the concentration 
28 
 
curve) which shows what proportion of overall income belongs to what proportion of the 
population. This can be adapted to the study of fertility inequality to see, for a particular time 
period for example, what proportion of women bears what proportion of the total offspring. Figure 
3.3 represents the different reproductive concentration curves in Cameroon between 1991 and 
2011. A perfectly equal distribution of births would be one in which all women have the same 
number of children. But we know that “there is no population where all women bear the same 
number of children” (Lutz, 1987). On the extremely opposite side, a perfectly unequal distribution 
of births would be one in which a limited portion of women bear all the children and the rest has 
none. Cameroon does not fit in either category. As seen in figure 3.2, fertility in Cameroon is still 
at a high level and has not declined but rather reversed. The consequences of this trend is that the 
concentration curves follow almost a similar pattern over time as shown in figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3: Trends in the concentration of reproduction in Cameroon 1991 – 2011 
 
To complete the Lorenz curves, a numerical measure of inequality called the Gini coefficient 
developed by Corrado Gini (1912) is used. An increasing value of the Gini coefficient simply 
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corresponds to an increasing level of reproductive inequality. In Cameroon, the level of fertility 
concentration increased significantly between 1991 and 1998 (from 11 to 16 %) as illustrated by 
figure 3.4 and from 2004 to 2011 (from 16 to 19%).  
 
Figure 3.4: Trends in the Gini coefficient in Cameroon 1991 - 2011 
 
 
 
Analytic Approach 
Given the dynamic nature of our research question, the study uses classic regression analysis 
coupled with decomposition methods to document recent trends in fertility inequality in 
Cameroon. The measures used to measure inequalities are differentials (in the mean number of 
children ever born and the mean ideal number of children) and concentration (of the total fertility 
rate and the wanted fertility rate using the CV²). The CV² is a full measure that integrates 
information about components of group sizes as well as group differentials in fertility rates. The 
CV² constitutes the main outcome variable for the decomposition analyzes and the comparison 
variable is the level of educational level. The level of education (or instruction) is an important 
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SES variable and a measure of the last grade completed by the woman. It has three modalities, 
namely: No education, primary, and secondary and higher.  
The analytical chapter proceeds in three steps: First, it starts with the estimation of the level of 
overall fertility differentials and concentration over time by educational attainment using the 
coefficient of variation. It then adds an analysis of wanted fertility inequalities (both at the 
individual and national level). Second, it determines the sources of change in fertility inequalities 
using a simple decomposition method. Third and finally, it highlights the substantive contribution 
of different socioeconomic categories in the overall behavioral effects to determine which groups 
have the most important influence in the increase of inequalities in Cameroon overtime.   
 
Step 1: Description of the trends in fertility inequalities 
The formula of the CV² is obtained as in Firebaugh (1999), adapted for the study of reproductive 
inequalities in Sub-Saharan Africa by Giroux et al. (2008)  
 
Where i indicates the different groups of our classification variable (educational level), wi refers 
to the relative size of these groups, and ri the ratio of the fertility of these groups to the overall 
fertility level. A higher/increasing value of the CV overtime would indicate an increasing 
concentration of reproduction in Cameroon.  
 
Step 2: Basic decomposition of trends in fertility inequalities 
Once the value of the CV² is obtained for each period, it becomes possible to decompose the 
changes in the CV² into behavioral effects and compositional effects, as in the formula below  
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The first part is the contribution of changes in behavioral differentiation in the overall rate. The 
second part is the overall contribution of changes in population composition to the overall rate 
change. A preponderance of the behavioral effect will indicate a differentiation scenario whereas 
a greater share of the compositional effect will indicate a simple demographic 
distribution/composition scenario (Eloundou – Enyegue et al., 2017). 
 
Step 3: Contributions of socioeconomic categories to the overall behavioral effects 
Once the first two steps are completed, the substantive contributions of different socioeconomic 
groups are highlighted with the percentage share of each individual educational group to the overall 
behavioral effects on the changes in fertility inequalities, thus allowing to identify which groups a 
potential policy decision to decrease fertility inequalities should target.  
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CHAPTER 4. 
FINDINGS 
 
Trends in fertility inequalities  
How do reproductive inequalities evolve in Cameroon as the national fertility rate changes? We 
first begin to look at the evolution of the TFR from 1991 to 2011. In the first period (1991–1998), 
the change is negative and the total fertility rate declines by 17 %.10 For the two following periods, 
the changes in the TFR are positive (2% and 3%) indicating an upsurge in fertility in Cameroon. 
 
Figure 4.1: Changes (%) in fertility rates in Cameroon (1991 – 2011) 
 
 
What factors account for these changes and more importantly what caused the reversal in fertility 
rates in Cameroon in recent years? The results of the decomposition analyses reveal that the main 
source of changes in fertility is a behavioral effect. (See Figure A.2 in the Appendix) 
                                                          
10 During that period, the TFR decreased from 5.8 to 4.8.  
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Across all three study periods, behavioral differentiation constitutes the major driver of the 
changes in the TFR specially during 1998 - 2004. If we look at the substantive contribution of 
different educational categories, we see that it’s mostly women with primary education level that 
contributed both to the decrease in fertility observed in the first period (1991 – 1998) as well as to 
the reversal of fertility in the following period (1998 – 2004). In the last period, the contributions 
of the different educational groups to the behavioral effect are almost equal. (See Figure A.3 in the 
Appendix) 
With regards to fertility inequalities, Figure 4.2 shows that the trends in fertility differentials 
between women of higher SES and their counterparts decrease in the first place and then start to 
increase.  
 
Figure 4.2: Trends in fertility differentials in Cameroon (1991 – 2011) 
 
 
Next, we consider inequalities in wanted fertility, and the results indicate that the level of 
differentials is higher between women with a secondary and higher education and their 
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counterparts. The results show that women without education have on average a desire for more 
children (2 or more on average) than women with secondary and higher education overtime. The 
same is true for women with primary education level.  
 
Figure 4.3: Trends in (wanted) fertility differentials in Cameroon (1991 – 2011) 
 
 
Based on the results above, a woman with no education in 2011 had on average 1.11 more children 
than a woman of secondary and higher education level. But she also wanted 1.91 more children 
than a woman with secondary and higher education level. And a woman of primary education level 
had on average 0.55 more children than women of secondary and higher educational level and 
desired 0.82 more children than the women of the reference group.  
When we separate women of reproductive age between younger generations (15 – 34) and older 
generations (35 – 49), the disequalizing effect of education is even more significant, especially 
between older women generations.  (See Figure A. 5 and Table A.1 in the Appendix).  
Next, we observe the trends in national fertility inequality in Cameroon between 1991 and 2011.  
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Figure 4.4 illustrates the evolution of the squared coefficient of variation (CVsq) by educational 
level. In the first period (1991 – 1998), the level of fertility concentration by educational level 
increases by 124 % indicating growing reproductive inequalities. The pattern in this graph is 
consistent with expectations. Between 1998 and 2004, the CVsq increases by 33%. Finally, for the 
last period (2004 - 2011), fertility concentration increases slightly by 9%. 
 
Figure 4.4: Trends in fertility concentration in Cameroon (1991 – 2011)  
  
 
The general conclusion from this graph is that we see a continuous concentration in fertility in 
Cameroon between 1991 and 2011 but not in a monotonous pace. In fact, the concentration is 
sensitive to the magnitude of the change in the nation fertility rate. When the TFR decreases at an 
important pace, the change observed in the level of fertility concentration is important. However, 
in case of a slow change in fertility trends, the results indicate that the level of fertility 
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concentration is less important, although the overall level of inequalities remains high. Inequalities 
still exist but they increase at a slower pace.  
What about wanted fertility inequalities?  
Figure 4.5 represents the change in wanted fertility inequalities using the CVsq. Data show a 
decrease in the level of wanted fertility over time but still remaining high (at 4.1 in 2011. See 
Figure A.6 in Appendix). As illustrated by figure 4.5, the inequalities in wanted fertility have risen 
over time.  
We note an increase of the CVsq by 94 % between 1991 and 1998 followed by a stagnation phase 
between 1998 and 2004. Finally, the last period is characterized by an increase in the concentration 
of wanted fertility, which increased by 33%. 
 
Figure 4.5: Trends in wanted fertility inequality in Cameroon 1991 - 2011 
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Basic decomposition of trends in fertility inequalities 
This section identifies the main drivers of changes in reproductive inequalities over time and their 
historical evolution using a decomposition method. (Table 4.1) The prime driver of the change in 
the national reproductive inequalities for the first two periods is mostly a behavioral effect. 
Between 1991 and 1998, the share of the behavioral effect in the change in inequality was 102%. 
Between 1998 and 2004, 98% of the change in reproductive inequalities reflected behavioral 
influences. And finally, between the last two survey years (2004 – 2011), behavioral effects 
accounted for 47 % of the total change in the inequalities in reproductive behaviors. Overtime, the 
compositional effect becomes the main driver of the increase in fertility inequalities.  
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Table 4.1: Basic decomposition of trends in overall fertility inequality in Cameroon 1991 – 2011 
Educational 
levels 
Time 1  
Inequality 
Time 2   
Inequality 
Change in 
Inequality 
Decomposition of change 
TFR % of women TFR 
% of 
women 
Compositional 
effect 
Behavioral 
effect 
Groups 
contribution 
No education 6.2 40.2 0.0019 6.1 28.1 0.0206 0.019 -0.0035 0.023 98% 
Primary 6.4 33.3 0.0036 5 38.6 0.0007 -0.003 0.0003 -0.003 -14% 
Secondary and 
higher 4.5 26.5 0.0133 3.6 33.3 0.0208 0.007 0.0038 0.004 15% 
Total 5.8 100 0.0188 4.8 100 0.0421 0.023 -0.001 (-2%) 
0.024 
(102%) 100 
               
Educational 
levels 
Time 2 
Inequality 
Time 3   
Inequality 
Change in 
Inequality 
Compositional 
effect 
Behavioral 
effect 
Groups 
contribution TFR % of women TFR 
% of 
women 
No education 6.1 28.1 0.0206 6.3 22.4 0.0151 -0.005 -0.0040 -0.001 -11% 
Primary 5 38.6 0.0007 5.6 38.6 0.0056 0.005 0.0000 0.005 37% 
Secondary and 
higher 3.6 33.3 0.0208 3.5 39 0.0351 0.014 0.0043 0.010 74% 
Total 4.8 100 0.0421 5 100 0.0558 0.014 0.001 (2%) 
0.013 
(98%) 100% 
               
Educational 
levels 
Time 3 
Inequality 
Time 4   
Inequality 
Change in 
Inequality 
Compositional 
effect 
Behavioral 
effect 
Groups 
contribution TFR % of women TFR 
% of 
women 
No education 6.3 22.4 0.0151 6.8 20 0.0222 0.007 -0.0021 0.009 408% 
Primary 5.6 38.6 0.0056 5.9 33.8 0.0083 0.003 -0.0009 0.004 164% 
Secondary and 
higher 3.5 39 0.0351 3.8 46.2 0.0300 -0.005 0.0055 -0.011 -472% 
Total 5 100 0.0558 5.1 100 0.0606 0.005 0.003 (53%) 
0.002 
(47%) 100% 
39 
 
With regards to wanted fertility inequalities, the results of the decomposition in table 4.2 indicate 
that the primary source of the changes in wanted fertility inequalities is the behavioral effect.  
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Table 4.2: Basic decomposition of trends in wanted fertility inequality in Cameroon 1991 - 201111 
 
Educational 
levels 
1991 
Inequality 
1998 
Inequality 
Change in 
Inequality 
Decomposition of change in Inequality 
WTFR 
% of 
women WTFR 
% of 
women 
Compositional 
effect 
Behavioral 
effect 
Groups 
contribution 
No education 5.9 40.2 0.0080 5.9 28.1 0.0224 0.014 -0.0054 0.020 68% 
Primary 5.4 33.3 0.0006 4.3 38.6 0.0016 0.001 0.0000 0.001 3% 
Secondary and 
higher 3.6 26.5 0.0244 3 33.3 0.0402 0.016 0.0072 0.009 29% 
Total 5.17 100 0.0330 4.6 100 0.0642 0.031 0.001 (4%) 
0.030 
(96%) 100% 
               
Educational 
levels 
2004 
Inequality 
2011 
Inequality 
Change in 
Inequality 
Compositional 
effect 
Behavioral 
effect 
Groups 
contribution WTFR 
% of 
women WTFR 
% of 
women 
No education 6 22.4 0.0248 6.1 20 0.0476 0.023 -0.0040 0.027 115% 
Primary 5.1 38.6 0.0068 5.2 33.8 0.0243 0.018 -0.0019 0.020 84% 
Secondary and 
higher 3.2 39 0.0325 3.4 46.2 0.0134 -0.019 0.0038 -0.023 -99% 
Total 4.5 100 0.0641 4.1 100 0.0853 0.021 -0.002 (-11%) 
0.023 
(111%) 100% 
                                                          
11 There were no changes in Inequalities between 1998 and 2004 
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Substantive contributions of different categories of educational level (1991 – 2011) 
This section shows how different educational categories contribute to the overall effect of the 
behavioral factor on reproductive inequalities. In other words, if fertility has become increasingly 
concentrated in Cameroon and that this concentration comes mainly from a behavioral effect in 
the first two study periods, to what particular educational group’s influence is this behavioral effect 
due?  
From Figure 4.6, it appears that for the first period, 98% of the behavioral effect is due to women 
with no education who are the main drivers of the increase in reproductive inequalities between 
1991 and 1998, given that they are those who experienced the lowest decrease in their fertility. 
Between 1998 and 2004, women of secondary or higher educational level are the ones contributing 
the most to the increase in inequalities because they are the only ones for whom the TFR had 
decreased (by 0.1 child on average)..  
Finally, for the last two periods, women with secondary and high educational level contribute the 
most to the change in fertility inequalities.  
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Figure 4.6: Contributions of the different education categories in the total behavioral effect 
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CHAPTER 5. 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined the evolution of fertility inequalities in Cameroon and how the contribution 
of education in accounting for the change in reproductive heterogeneities evolved over time. The 
general concern about Sub-Saharan African fertility, and the insufficiency of strong theoretical 
and empirical studies linking it to broader socioeconomic inequalities makes this research’s 
contribution extremely timely. In fact, what is at stake is whether or not Sub-Saharan Africa will 
experience a steady demographic dividend, like other regions of the world, and to what extent and 
how the prospects of a potential demographic dividend will unfold evenly across social classes 
given the current context of staggering social differences in reproductive behaviors.  
The study results provide evidence of growing inequalities in fertility in Cameroon in the course 
of recent years both at the micro as well as the macro level. At the micro level, results from the 
regression analysis reveal that the differences in childbearing between women of different 
educational level remain increasingly significant. The higher the educational level, the lower the 
number of children and vice versa. At the macro level, the concentration in fertility increased by 
221 % between 1991 and 2011 led by a behavioral differentiation. Indeed, the results from the 
decomposition analysis demonstrate that the behavioral differentiation played a key role in the 
increase in fertility inequalities between 1991 and 2004 with educated women being the leaders in 
terms of fertility decline.  
In the last period (2004-2011), however, the main factor contributing to the increase in inequalities 
is the compositional effect (53%) while the behavioral effect contributes to the overall change by 
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47%. It appears here that the effect of education shifts from a dominantly qualitative effect 
(behavioral) to a quantitative one (mass education).  
While these results contribute to a better understanding of the ongoing demographic changes in 
Cameroon, the study falls short in illustrating how fertility inequalities contribute or have an 
impact on the current and future distribution of resources, especially among children, in Cameroon. 
Furthermore, the data used for this work do not allow an in-depth analysis of the intergenerational 
consequences of fertility inequalities. Future studies should look at the importance of the 
intergenerational transmission of inequalities using micro-level historical data.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1: Population of the world and major areas 2015, 2030, 2050 and 2100 according to the 
medium-variant projection (UN, 2015) 
 
  2015 2030 2050 2100 
World 7349 
(100) 
8501 
(100) 
9725 
(100) 
11213 
(100) 
Africa  1186 
(16%) 
1679 
(20%) 
2478 
(25%) 
4387 
(39%) 
Asia 4393 
(60%) 
4923 
(58%) 
5267 
(54%) 
4889 
(44%) 
Europe 738 
(10%) 
734 
(9%) 
707 
(7%) 
646 
(6%) 
Latin America and the 
Carribbean 
634 
(9%) 
721 
(8%) 
784 
(8%) 
721 
(6%) 
Northern America 358 
(5%) 
396 
(5%)  
433 
(4%) 
500 
(4%) 
Oceania 39  
(1%) 
47  
(1%) 
57  
(1%) 
71  
(1%) 
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Figure A.1: Decomposition of changes in Total fertility rates in Cameroon (1991 – 2011)  
 
Figure A.2: Substantive contribution of educational groups to the behavioral effect on changes in 
Total fertility rates in Cameroon (1991 – 2011)  
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Figure A.3: Substantive contribution of educational groups to the Compositional effect on changes 
in Total fertility rates in Cameroon (1991 – 2011)  
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Table A.2: Regression results of fertility differentials in Cameroon (1991 – 2011) 
 
 
 
  1991   1998   2004   2011   
 All 15-34 35-49 All 15-34 35-49 All 15-34 35-49 All 15-34 35-49  
 women(15   women(15   women(15   women(15    
 -49)   -49)   -49)   -49)    
No 1.04*** 0.74*** 1.42*** 0.77*** 0.67*** 1.11*** 0.99*** 0.81*** 1.36*** 1.11*** 0.70*** 1.81***  
education              
Primary 0.67*** 0.56*** 0.57 0.54*** 0.30*** 0.95*** 0.49*** 0.42*** 0.65*** 0.55*** 0.38*** 0.89***  
              
Secondary ref Ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref 
and Higher              
              
TFR  5.8   4.8   5   5.1   
Age 0.52*** 0.28*** 0.64 0.43*** 0.14** 0.8* 0.41*** 0.17*** 0.48 0.41*** 0.24*** 0.39*  
              
Age ² -0.005*** -0.0005 -0.007 -0.003*** 0.002* -0.008* -0.003*** 0.001 -0.004 -0.003*** -0.00006 -0.003  
              
              
Nbr of Obs 2591 1834 757 3705 2430 1275 7137 4723 2414 10099 6514 3585  
              
R-squarred 48.1 47.11 8.82 49.35 50.22 10.87 53.36 49.47 16.99 52.53 50.94 23.84  
              
F 146.31 88.02 7 227.3 141 11.21 436.11 208.23 25.46 497.67 289.34 55.51  
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 Table A.3: Regression results of (wanted) fertility differentials in Cameroon (1991 – 2011) 
 
 
  1991 1998 2004 2011 
  All 
women(15 
-49) 
15-34 35-49 All 
women(15 
-49) 
15-34 35-49 All 
women(15 
-49) 
15-34 35-49 All 
women(15 
-49) 
15-34 35-49 
No 
education 
2.34*** 2.58*** 1.85*** 1.85*** 1.94*** 1.84*** 2.26*** 2.36*** 1.97*** 1.91*** 2.00*** 1.77*** 
Primary 0.80*** 0.89*** 0.32 0.65*** 0.52*** 1.08*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.63*** 0.82*** 0.78*** 0.90*** 
Secondary 
and Higher 
ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref ref Ref ref 
                          
WFR 5.2 4.6 4.5 4.1 
Age 0.04 -0.15 1.04 -.001 -0.06 0.23 0.008 -0.07 0.006 -0.0034 -0.10** -0.13 
Age ² -0.000 0.0041 -0.012 .001 0.002 -0.002 0.0008 0.002 0.0009 0.001 0.003*** 0.002 
             
Nbr of Obs 3002 2720 791 4737 3610 1127 9012 6970 2042 14341 10645 3696 
R-squared 24.92 27.35 15.69 23.69 21.60 16.51 31.12 30.29 21.03 25.06 25.25 13.80 
F 48.48 45.19 9.76 74.28 48.94 13.79 161.59 106.50 29.80 174.76 112.80 337.92 
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Figure A.4: Trends in (overall) fertility differentials in Cameroon (1991 – 2011)  
 
 
Figure A.5: Trends in (wanted) fertility differentials in Cameroon (1991 – 2011)  
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Figure A.6: Trends in Wanted fertility rates and changes in wanted fertility rates in Cameroon 
(1991 – 2011)  
 
 
Figure A.7: Decomposition of changes in Wanted fertility rates in Cameroon (1991 – 2011)  
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